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Abstract: In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of potential adoption of 
herbicide-tolerant (HT) genetically modified (GM) rapeseed in France. Our aim is to study ex 
ante the potential impact of their adoption in France, in terms of adoption level, economic 
gains, and distribution of these gains between farmers and input suppliers. We use French 
survey data about current plant protection practices, in order to compute pesticide costs with 
conventional (i.e., non GM) crops for individual farms. Then, based on results of technical 
studies about GM variety trials in France, we compute a predicted pesticide cost with the GM 
variety. Next, we study adoption rates and gains or losses of farmers (adopters and non 
adopters) and upstream companies (sellers of conventional herbicides, of the total herbicide to 
which GM rapeseed is tolerant, of GM seed), depending on the GM seed license price, the 
margin rate on herbicide sales and the price of conventional herbicides.  
 
1. Introduction 
GMOs with improved agronomic traits have been diffused quickly in North America, 
while they have progressively raised a huge controversy in the European Union, resulting in a 
moratorium on these products. One aspect of the controversy on GMOs is their economic 
impact. The high diffusion of these products in the United States has led American 
economists to study this question (see e.g. Joly, Lemarié et al., 2000, and OECD, 2000, for a 
synthesis), most of these studies concluding that the economic impact of GM crops is 
positive. Another aspect of the controversy is how benefits are shared between different 
groups, from upstream companies to the final consumers. Although this question has been 
less studied in the United States (US), studies generally conclude that though innovators 
(biotech and seed companies) take over a large share of benefits, the part accruing to farmers 
is important. Should we conclude, then, that non adoption of GMOs in the EU leads to an 
important economic loss for farmers and other groups? Though existing studies show the 
pertinence of this question, it seems difficult to transpose their results directly, because of the 
difference in distributions of crops and plant protection problems between North America and 
the European Union. In this paper, we aim to contribute to this question by an empirical study 
on genetically modified (GM) herbicide tolerant (HT) rapeseed. We explore its potential 
diffusion level in France, the optimal price of the GM seed for upstream companies, and the 
impact of GMOs on gains of farmers, pesticide suppliers and suppliers of the GM innovation.  
Our methodology relies on two lessons drawn from US studies. Firstly, it appears that 
potential gains from GMOs vary widely from one farm to another, largely due to differences 
in weed/insect infestations and weed control practices (see e.g. Bullock and Nitsi, 2000). 
Secondly, diffusion of GMOs has been very fast, which seems to indicate that farmers have 
learned very quickly about this innovation. Drawing from these two lessons, we abstract from 
adoption timing and we focus on heterogeneity of potential gains between farmers due to 
different pest problems and pest control practices. We leave aside some aspects of the 
controversy on GMOs (their effects on health and on the environment), as well as the question 
of the costs of segregation and identity preservation of non GMO products. Developments 
presented here have two main interests. First, they take into account heterogeneity of gains for 
farmers. Second, they give an estimation of the profit level of this innovator, for different   2
levels of the price premium on the GM seed, which is one of the less well-known among the 
different variables entering in gains for farmers.  
 
2. General assumptions 
Simulations are conducted under five restrictive assumptions. We examine the incentive to 
adopt for different kinds of farmers, given the expected effect of GMOs on their production 
costs, but we do not examine the potential effect of adoption on farm prices and land 
allocation between crops. We do not take into account negative externalities, from risks of 
gene transfer towards weeds. Our simulations on GM adoption by farmers are only based on 
economies in herbicide use, and we do not take into account other effects of adoption (e.g., 
gain in time at a critic period). We keep changes on herbicide prices exogenous (i.e., we do 
not explicitly model market equilibrium displacement between prices of herbicides and price 
of the GMO innovation). At least, we ignore the cost of segregation of GM and non-GM 
channels. 
In our analysis, we consider three types of actors, farmers, suppliers of conventional 
herbicides and the innovator. Each farmer chooses between a conventional and a GMO plant 
protection program. We assume a constant and identical margin from sales of different 
conventional herbicides. We assume that a unique innovator supplies the GMO seed.  
Due to our reductive assumptions, it is necessary to keep three observations in mind. What 
we consider here as the innovator profit actually covers the innovator profit and the profit of 
GMO seed producers. The innovator profit remunerates some sunk costs that have been 
encountered to bring the innovation on the market,  i.e. research costs and costs of tests 
necessary to bring the innovation on the market. Gains of farmers do not take into account 
transfers to the downstream sectors that will happen if there is a price decrease. In other 
words, the gain of farmers should rather be considered as the gain of farmers and downstream 
actors.  
Under this set of assumptions, we now define the simulation method. We start by an 
observation on the conventional program used by each farmer and its per hectare cost. For 
each type of conventional program, an alternative GMO program allowing to reach the same 
yield is proposed. In other words, farm gain relies only on a decrease in weeding costs. 
Depending on the cost decrease (or cost increase) of the GMO program compared with the 
conventional program, the farmer chooses to keep the same conventional program or to adopt 
the alternative GMO program. After aggregating farmers' choices, it is possible to draw the 
curve of demand for GM seed as a function of the price premium of the GM seed compared 
with the conventional seed, and to estimate the gains of the innovator and the losses of 
suppliers of conventional herbicides.  
Even with this simplified framework, estimations depend on many variables, among which 
some are known better than others. The per hectare quantities of herbicides and the 
correspondence between conventional and GMO programs are well known and should not 
change much after the introduction of GMOs. They keep the same value in all our 
estimations. The margin on herbicides, the minimal gain that farmer anticipates to choose to 
adopt the GMO program, and the price of conventional herbicides are not very well known or 
may change once GMOs are introduced. For each of these variables, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis. The price premium on the GM seed is endogenous in our model. Results are 
presented with a large range of values of this variable or at the optimum of the innovator (i.e. 
when the price premium on the GM seed maximizes the profit of the innovator).  
   3
3. Analytical framework  
We use index j for farmers; index k of the type of rapeseed, taking two values, c for 
conventional rapeseed and  g for GM rapeseed; index i for conventional herbicides. We let p 
denote the farm output price; 
g
s w  denote the additional price paid on the GM seed compared 
with the conventional seed (latter called "license price"); 
c
h w  denote the vector of prices of 
conventional herbicides (
c
hi w  being the price of conventional herbicide i); 
g
h w  denote the price 
of the GMO herbicide g (i.e., the total herbicide to which GM rapeseed is tolerant); ∆ denote 
additional profit for which the farmer adopts GM rapeseed. Variables specific to farmer j are 
yj, denoting yield obtained by farmer j (assumed identical for GMO and conventional 
rapeseed);  sj , denoting rapeseed area for farmer j; 
c
ij h  denoting per hectare quantity of 
conventional herbicide i by farmer j; 
g
j h , denoting per hectare quantity of GMO herbicide g 
by farmer j;  cj , denoting all other costs of farmer j including the cost of the conventional 
seed. Total area allocated to rapeseed is constant and given by  ∑ =
j
j s S . Farmer j's profit on 
one hectare of conventional rapeseed is equal to his revenue minus his costs (cost of 
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Farmer j's profit on one hectare of GM rapeseed is equal to his revenue minus his costs 
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These profits are functions of input and output prices. In the case of a conventional 
program, per hectare quantities of conventional herbicide 
c
ij h  are assumed optimal for the 
farmer given his specific characteristics and given output and input prices.  
In the case of GMO program, we establish a correspondence between the characteristics of 
the conventional program initially conducted and the characteristics of the GMO program 
appearing as optimal. This correspondence was established in link with the French technical 
institute for oilseeds, Centre Technique Interprofessionnel des Oléagineux Métropolitains 
(CETIOM). It depends on the number of herbicide applications.  
Adoption condition 
Farmer j adopts if the profit with the best GMO program yields an additional profit at least 
equal to ∆ compared with the profit obtained with the best conventional program. 
Equivalently, farmer j adopts the GMO program if it yields a cost economy at least equal to ∆ 
compared with the best conventional program. 
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Note that our comparison in profit levels is equivalent to a comparison in cost levels for 
two reasons: (i) we assume identical yields for both programs, (ii) we assume an identical 
output price for both types of rapeseed.  
The preceding equation may also be written as: 
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We define a variable γj equal to1 if farmer j adopts the GMO program and 0 if farmer j 
stays on a conventional program: 
∆ γ
∆ γ
− − > ⇔ =
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In what follows, we analyze adoption as a function of the GMO seed license price, 
g
s w , for 
given price levels of other inputs. For farmer j, the preceding equation shows that adoption 
occurs only when 
g









hi h w ) h w ( . This 
threshold value is different among farmers. Moreover, it is a function of prices of 
conventional herbicides, 
c
h w , price of the GMO herbicide, 
g
h w , and the minimal additional 
profit level, ∆.  
Besides, we note in the preceding equation that the value of parameter  j γ  (0 or 1) does not 
depend on variables 
g
s w  and ∆ independently, but depends on the sum of these two variables, 
( ∆ +
g
s w ). Let us then consider the effect of an increase in parameter ∆ from an initial value ∆1 
to a final value ∆2 (i.e. an increase in the additional profit needed to "convince" farmers to 
adopt the GMO program). All other things equal, the adoption condition for farmer j stays 




s w w ), i.e., if the GM seed license price decreases from an initial 
value 
g




s w w .  
Adoption rate 
When adopted by a farmer, the GMO program is adopted to its whole area allocated to 
rapeseed,  j s .  The GMO adoption rate is defined as the share of total rapeseed area where the 






(From what precedes, we note that, all other things equal, the GMO adoption rate stays 
unchanged when parameter ∆ increases from ∆1 to ∆2, if the GMO seed license price 
decreases from 
g




s w w ). 
Input demand 




g s S γ . Total sales of the GMO herbicide are equal the sum of per hectare quantities 





g s h Q γ . Total sales of each 
conventional herbicide i are equal to the sum of per hectare quantities used multiplied by 
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Profits 
Here, we make the three following assumptions. The company selling the GMO innovation 
also sells the GMO herbicide. The margin rate on herbicides, denoted by φ, is identical for all 
products. The production cost of the GM seed is equal to the production cost of the 
conventional seed (in other words, the margin on sales on the GMO is equal to 100%).   5
The profit of the innovator selling the GM seed is equal to the sum of profits from sales of 
GM seeds (GM seed license price multiplied by the total GMO area) and profits from sales of 
the GMO herbicide (margin rate on the GMO herbicide multiplied by the total quantity of 
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Profits from sales of the conventional herbicide i are equal to the margin rate on 
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Total profits of farmers on rapeseed are equal to the sum of profits of farmers adopting the 
GMO program and profits of farmers staying on a conventional program:  
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This total profit may be written as: 
a a a CH − Π = Π 0 , where 
a
0 Π  is the total margin realized 
by farmers on rapeseed before deducting herbicide costs, and CH
a is the sum of weeding 
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Under our assumptions, 
a
0 Π  is a constant independent on the adoption rate of GMO 
programs.  
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The sum of weeding expenses is composed of two terms. The first one is equal to total 




Our analysis is led using a data from the farm survey  "charte environnement" from CETIOM  
led in 1999 (1999 harvest). Our database is composed of 1238 farms covering a total rapeseed 
area of  around 32  000 hectares (2.4% of the French rapeseed area). Sampling bias was 
corrected attributing a weight to each farm in order to ensure national representativeness of 
French geographic departments and of rapeseed area classes. Then, results presented here are 
national projections on the 1.369 millions hectares of rapeseed in France. The important 
diversity of conventional strategies of plant protection in the sample results in highly variable 
weeding costs in the sample, with weeding expenses varying between 0 and 1300 F/ha, with a 
mean of 547 F/ha. 
It may take up to three applications to weed rapeseed, at the following stages: pre-sowing, 
pre-emergence, and post-emergence. Strategies of conventional/GMO replacement (Table 1) 
have been defined using Gigandon and Pilorge (1997) and CETIOM data (2000). The GMO 
program considered here is a program combining the total herbicide Roundup (glyphosate) 
with a rape seed resistant to Roundup (or Roundup-Ready
 seed). The herbicide cost of the 
GMO program varies between 100 and 200F/hectare, the average price used for RoundUp 
(w
h
g) being equal to 50 F/l.   6
Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate the cost distribution of the two sub-samples corresponding 
to GMO programs with respectively one and two RoundUp applications. In our first 
simulations, before the sensitivity analysis, prices of conventional herbicides are assumed 
constant and margin rate on conventional herbicides is assumed equal to 50%. 
Table 1. Replacement of conventional programs by GMO programs 
    Conventional program  GMO program 




6%  248  Pre-sowing only (economical program) 
17% 527  Pre-emergence  only 
24% 508  Pre-sowing  –  Pre-emergence 
2% 538  Post-emergence  only 
One application, 
 2 l/ha ( h
g= 2) 
16% 450  Pre-sowing  –  Post-emergence 
11%  701  Pre-emergence – Post-emergence 
24%  674  Pre-sowing – Pre-emergence - Post-emergence 
Two applications, 
 2 l/ha each ( h
g= 4) 
* The absence of post-emergence application may result from the absence of an efficient 
product. In this case, a second application with the total herbicide could be pertinent. We do 
not account for this fact here. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of herbicide costs: conventional programs 
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Figure 2. Distribution of herbicide costs: conventional programs 




































5. Base case simulation 
Adoption of GMOs 
Figure  represents the adoption curve of GMOs as a function of the GM seed license price 
(w
g
s). When the GM seed price is equal to the conventional seed price (w
g
s=0), the adoption 
rate is higher than 90%. In this case, the cost of a GMO herbicide program varies between 
100 and 200 F/ha. Then, from the conventional herbicide cost distribution (Figure 3), it is 
clear that GMOs are generating cost savings for many farmers. On the opposite, for a GM 
seed license price exceeding 600 F/ha, the adoption rate is less than 10%. Here too, from 
Figure 3, not many farmers would be interested by a GMO program costing around 700 to 
800  F/ha. Between these two extreme values, the slope of the adoption curve takes high 
values (especially between 300 F/ha and 500 F/ha), leading to decreases of around 3500 ha 
(or 0.25% of French areas) by additional Franc on the GM seed. 
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Farmers' herbicide expenses   8
To begin with, we study the evolution of farmers' herbicide expenses for different levels of 
the GM seed license price (i.e., for different levels of adoption of GMOs). 
On the right of Figure 4, the GM seed license price is very high and deters all farmers from 
adopting, even farmers with high conventional herbicide expenses. All farmers keep their 
conventional herbicide cost: this is the reference situation of the survey, where total herbicide 
expenses are around 750 MF. 
When going to the left, the GM seed license price decreases and becomes attractive for 
some farmers. These farmers adopt as soon as the cost of the GMO program equals the cost of 
conventional herbicides.  When adopting, farmers stop having expenses on conventional 
herbicides. Weeding  expenses then are composed of expenses on conventional herbicides, 
expenses on the GMO herbicide, and additional expenses due to the GM seed license cost.   
Then, as the GM seed license price decreases, the increasing adoption leads to a high 
decrease in total weeding expenses by farmers. Under our assumptions, the expenses decrease 
from 750 MF to 200 MF when the GM seed price equals the conventional seed price.  
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Gains and losses of upstream companies  
Here we assume that the innovator sets the GM seed license price in order to maximize its 
profits. Then, he arbitrates between a small license price allowing a large adoption of the 
innovation but yielding a small unit margin, and a high license allowing a large unit margin 
but restricting the adoption of GMOs.  
Figure  gives a first indication on this optimum. If the profit of the innovator is only based 
on royalties on sales of GM seeds, a maximum is reached for a GM seed license price equal to 
321 F/ha. The profit of the innovator is then equal to 329 MF and GM varieties are adopted 
on 75% of French areas (Figure ). Assuming that the innovator's profit also includes gains on 
sales of the complementary GMO herbicide (Figure 5), then the optimum GM seed license 
price is also equal to 321 F/ha. In other words, counting or not margins on sales of the GMO 
herbicide in the innovator's profit does not change the optimal GM seed license price. This 
results is due to the low price of the complementary GMO herbicide.    9
Figure 5. Gains of the innovator, with or without taking into account revenues from 
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innovator's profit on the GM seed license
innovator's profit on the GMO herbicide
 
 
Let us now consider the competitors on conventional herbicides. Assuming a margin rate 
(φ) equal to 50%, losses of upstream companies on conventional herbicides increase from 0 to 
371  MF when the GM seed license price decreases from 1000  F/ha to 0  F/ha. When the 
innovator chooses the optimal price (w
s
g=321 F/ha), losses are equal to 321 MF, i.e. 85% of 
the initial profit. Then, it can be expected that conventional herbicide sellers react by 
decreasing their prices. This case will be studied latter (sensitivity analysis).  










0 200 400 600 800 1 000 1 200














Figure 7 sums up gains and losses by all upstream companies. For a GM seed license price 
smaller than 228 FF/ha, losses on conventional herbicides are higher than gains of the GMO 
innovator. The upstream sector is then globally loosing compared with the reference situation. 
On the opposite,  if the GM seed license price is higher than 228 FF/ha, then the upstream 
sector globally wins compared with the initial situation. This situation is due to a smaller 
herbicide production costs for the GMO program compared with conventional programs. 
Effectively, the production cost of the GM seed is equal to the production cost of the 
conventional seed. The production cost of the GM herbicide represents 50 to 100 F/ha 
depending on the type of GMO program (1 or 2 applications). The production cost of 
conventional herbicides represents 50% of sales of conventional herbicides and is generally   10
higher than 100 F/ha. Note, however, that these estimations depend on the rather arbitrary 
assumption of an identical margin rate on all conventional pesticides. This will be discussed 
latter with the sensitivity analysis.  
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Global assessment of gains and losses 
Table 2 summarizes gains and losses of different actors by combining the reference 
situation with the situation in which the GM seed license price is set to its optimal level by the 
innovator (321 F/ha). The adoption of GMO programs leads to a global gain of 245.3 MF. 
Two thirds of these gains are transmitted to farmers while one third of these gains accrues to 
upstream companies. A high share of the innovator's gains is realized to the detriment of 
upstream companies. Their profit decreases by around 321 MF, which is roughly equivalent 
to gain on the GM seed. 
Table 2. Gains and losses due to the GMO adoption (MF) 
Reference with GMO*  Variation
Revenue on the GM seed license  0 328,9  +328,9
Revenue on sales of the GMO herbicide   0 75,8  +75,8
Revenue on sales of conventional herbicides  374,2 53,2  -321,0
Farmers' weeding costs  -748,5 -586.9  +161,6
Total gain in the situation with GMOs  - -  +245,3
* The GM seed license price is equal to 321F/ha. 
 
Impact on the use of conventional herbicides 
We observed that commercialization of GMOs with a GM seed license price equal to 
321 F/ha leads to a 85% decrease in total sales of conventional herbicides. This decrease, 
however, is not homogenous on all products (Table 3). Thus, among the main conventional 
products, Colzor and Novall suffer a higher decrease (95%) than Treflan and Fusilade (70%). 
This difference is mainly explained by the cost of these herbicides in a conventional weeding 
program. Based on the average per hectare quantity in conventional programs (before the 
introduction of GMO), Colzor and Novall represent a cost higher than 450 F/ha, while Tréflan 
and Fusilade represent a cost smaller than 150 F/ha. Thus, when a product represents a high 
cost, he is mainly used in high cost conventional programs, which will be more easily 
replaced by GMO programs.   11



















Colzor  99  5,0 36,45% 272 836 465 14 843 812  -95%
Butisan S  234  1,4 20,03% 149 894 335 28 903 917  -81%
Novall  250  1,8 12,50% 93 593 180 4 533 717  -95%
Tréflan  28  2,4 6,94% 51 925 414 16 266 073  -69%
* The GM seed license price is equal to 321F/ha. 
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity to the additional profit at which farmers adopt GMO programs (∆) 
Figure  gives some indications on the sensitivity of our results to the minimal gain that has 
to be anticipated by the farmer in order to adopt (variable ∆). As shown in section 2, the 
adoption rate stays unchanged when the GM seed license price, 
g
s w , decreases by ∆. This 
leads to a translation of the demand curve to the left (when ∆ increases). The estimated 
adoption loss when ∆ increases by 100 F/ha varies between 10% and 25% depending on the 
GM seed license price. In the same way, we could observe that the curve of conventional 
weeding costs (Figure 8) translates to the left by ∆. 
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∆ = 50 FF/ha
∆ = 100 FF/ha
 
 
The profit curve of the innovator (Figure 9) decreases because of a given license price the 
adoption rate is always smaller. The maximum of these curves translates to the left when ∆ 
increases: in reaction to the more difficult adoption of GMOs, the innovator increases its 
profit if he decreases the GM seed license price by ∆. Then, the adoption rate at the optimum 
stays unchanged.   12
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Revenue on the GM seed license  0 328.9 226.0 +328.9  +226.0
Revenue on sales of the GMO 
herbicide   0 75.8 75.8 +75.8 +75.8
Revenue on sales of conventional 
herbicides  374.2 53.2 53.2 -321.0 -321.0
Farmers' weeding costs  -748.5 -586.9 483.0 +161.6  +264.0
Total gain (from A to B or from 
A to C)  - - +245.3 +245.3
* The GM seed license price is equal to 321F/ha. 
 
When we examine the global balance of gains and losses of different actors (Table 4), we 
note that an increase in ∆ leads to a surplus transfer of some of the innovator's gains to 
farmers. This transfer is integral and the global surplus variation stays unchanged. We note 
that in this case, the surplus variation of upstream companies is negative. The observation 
made in Figure  that the innovator's gains are higher than the losses of sellers of conventional 
herbicides is not confirmed here. 
 
Sensitivity to the margin rate on conventional herbicides (φ) 
The margin rate on conventional herbicides (φ) does not affect the adoption curve (Figure 
3) and has a limited effect on the innovator's profit curve, so that the optimal level of the GM 
seed license price stays unchanged. The adoption rate of GMOs is then unchanged. 
The effect of a change in φ  on gains and losses of different actors is illustrated in Table 5. 
In the case studied here, estimations corresponding to the reference situation (before the 
introduction of GMOs) are also modified. Farmers' gains and innovator's gains on sales of the 
GM seed are unchanged. However, because the margin rate is smaller, the loss of sellers of 
conventional herbicides is less important. Under these conditions, the gain of upstream actors   13
is more important and this directly affects the total gain. The share of farmers in the total 
gains is now smaller.  










Revenue on the GM seed license  0 328.9  +328.9
Revenue on sales of the GMO herbicide   0 37.9  +37.9
Revenue on sales of conventional herbicides  187.1 26.6  -160.5
Farmers' weeding costs  -748.5 -586.9  +161.6
Total gain (from A to B)    +367.9
 
Sensitivity to herbicide prices 
As indicated below, we may think that sellers of conventional herbicides would decrease 
their prices in reaction to a loss of 85% of their sales. We have to limit our analysis here to the 
very simple case where all farmers staying on a conventional program always choose the 
same application program. This assumption is verified if we assume an homothetical decrease 
in prices of all products. We present here some results assuming a 40% decrease in prices of 
conventional herbicides. 
The adoption curve of GMOs is translated to the left: for a given GM seed license price, 
much less farmers adopt (Figure 10). This has a direct effect on the profit of the innovator, 
which also decreases, leading to a displacement of the optimal GM seed license price to the 
left. When the price of conventional pesticides decreases by 40%, the optimal level of the GM 
seed license price decreases from 321 F/ha to 153 F/ha. In this case, counting or not counting 
gains on GMO herbicide sales has a higher effect on the optimal GM seed license price. This 
price decreases from 153  F/ha to 138  F/ha when these sales are taken into account. This 
decrease in the GM seed license price almost compensates the translation on the adoption 
curve, in the sense that GMO adoption now attains 67% of areas wit a GM seed license price 
equal to 153 F/ha. 
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no decrease in conventional herbicide prices
40 % decrease in conventional herbicide prices
 
Table 6 shows the effect on gains and losses of different actors. The decrease in the license 
price and the decrease in the herbicide prices lead to a clear gain for farmers, from +161 MF   14
to +378 MF. This figure represents not only the gain of adopters, but also the gain of non 
adopters. It should be noted however that the highest share of farmers' gains goes to adopters 
who benefit from the important decrease in the license price, while the increase in gains for 
non adopters is only equal to 10 MF. The gain for upstream companies diminishes clearly. 
For conventional herbicide sellers, the loss is higher than it was with unchanged prices. This 
follows from the very high decrease in the margin rate, from 50% to 17%. A 40% decrease in 
prices, then, does not allow these actors to limit their losses. However, it is possible that a less 
important decrease would allow them not to loose so much. For the innovator, benefits 
decrease clearly, because of the decrease in the price of the GM seed. Here again, we note that 
the innovator's gain no more compensates the losses for conventional herbicide sellers.  
















Revenue on the GM seed license  0 328.9 140.4 +328.9  +140.4
Revenue on sales of the GMO 
herbicide   0 75.8 65.4 +75.8 +65.4
Revenue on sales of conventional 
herbicides  374.2 53.2 16.7 -321.0 -357.5
Farmers' weeding costs  -748.5 -586.9 -369.6 +161.6  +378.9
Total gain (from A to B or from 
A to C)  - - +245.3 +227.2
* The GM seed license price is equal to 321F/ha. 
** The GM seed license price is equal to 153F/ha. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Here, we always consider the case where the innovator applies the optimal level of the GM 
seed license price. The sensitivity analysis allows to bring out several conclusions (Table 7): 
- The important adoption level observed in the base case (75%) is roughly confirmed in all 
cases. We saw that changing the additional profit at which farmers adopt the GMO program 
(∆) or changing the price of conventional herbicides leads to an important translation in the 
adoption curve. Yet, in both cases, the innovator adjusts his choice by decreasing its license 
price, so that the adoption rate at the optimum changes very little. Thus, the observation on 
the adoption rate seems quite robust.   
- The global estimated gain does not change much from on case to the other, because the 
change in parameters mainly leads to transfers between actors. It should be noted however 
that the assumption on the margin rate on herbicides has an important effect on the global 
gain: the smaller this margin rate is, the smaller are the losses on conventional herbicides, and 
the higher  is the total gain. 
- Farmers' gains in the base case correspond to a lower limit. Adopters' gains increase clearly 
when a change in a parameter brings the innovator to decrease the GM seed license price. 
- Estimating losses of conventional herbicide sellers is tricky because they depend  on the 
margin rate on which we don't have accurate information. The higher the margin rate is, 
the higher the losses will be. We may note however that the losses are always the same in 
proportion (85% decrease in sales).   15
- The gains of the innovator are very sensitive to assumptions made on ∆ and on the 
reaction of conventional herbicide sellers. The estimations realized here are rather an upper 
limit.  
- The gains of the innovator are in some cases higher, and in some cases smaller, than the 
losses of conventional herbicide sellers. The reason is that estimations of gains/losses for 
upstream companies are very sensitive to parameters, so that the difference between the 
two is also sensitive.  
Table 7. Synthesis of the effects observed 
 Base  case  ∆ ↑  φ ↓  w
h
c ↓ 
License 321  F/ha 
Decreases 
(variation equal 





Adoption rate  75%  Unchanged  Unchanged  Decreases 
lightly 
Losses of conventional 
herbicide sellers   - 321 MF  Unchanged 
Smaller 
(proportional to φ) 
Does not 
change much 








Gains on the GMO 
herbicide  +75.8 MF  Unchanged 
Smaller 
(proportional to φ) 
Decreases 
lightly 
Farmers' gains  +161 MF  Increases  Unchanged  Increases 
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